The U.S. hospital industry was reshaped during the 1990s, with many hospitals becoming members of health systems and networks. Our research examines whether safety net hospitals (SNHs) were generally included or excluded from these arrangements, and the factors associated with their involvement. Our analysis draws on the earlier work of Alexander and Morrisey (1988), and not only studies factors affecting SNH participation in multihospital arrangements but also updates their earlier study. We constructed measures for hospital market conditions, management, and mission, and examined network and system affiliation patterns between 1994 and 1998. Our findings suggest that larger and more technically advanced hospitals joined systems in the 1990s, which contrasts with 1980s findings that smaller, financially weak institutions joined systems. Further, SNH participation in networks and systems was more common when hospitals faced less market pressure and where only a limited number of unaffiliated hospitals remained. If networks and systems are key parties in negotiating with private payers, SNHs may be going it alone in these negotiations in highly competitive markets.
The U.S. hospital industry faced a variety of pressures during the 1990s, including reduced demand for inpatient care, increased use of selective contracting by health plans, and growing efforts among payers to contain hospital expenditures. Hospitals with a special commitment to serving the uninsured-namely, safety net hospitals or SNHs-faced these pressures plus others. In particular, despite a robust economy through 2000, the percentage of the U.S. population that was uninsured changed little, from its high of 16.3% in 1998 to 14.6% in 2001 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002). Also, the 1997 Balanced Budget Act and some state policy actions reduced public support for safety net services (Fishman and Bentley 1997) . To survive in the face of these pressures, hospitals-whether SNH or not-have had to rethink their organizational strategies and reorient their operations to remain viable.
Hospital restructuring activities were widespread during the 1990s (Bazzoli et al. 1999; Lee and Alexander 1999) . Perhaps the most impressive development was the proliferation of numerous health networks and health systems in the United States. Health networks are multihospital delivery entities in which affiliated hospitals are tied together through alliances or contractual affiliations. Health systems are multihospital arrangements in which affiliated hospitals are all owned and operated by a single parent organization. Thus, the key distinction between the two organizational forms is the presence of diversified ownership for health networks versus unified ownership for systems. In 1993, 50% of U.S. hospitals belonged to a health network or system, and this grew to 71% by 1998. 1 Health networks and systems can provide an array of benefits to their hospital affiliates that may lead to improvements in financial performance. As a result, hospitals may value health network or system participation, especially as markets become more competitive, payers become more powerful, and slack resources become even less available.
Our paper has two objectives: 1) to identify hospital and market factors that have influenced hospital participation in health networks and systems during the 1990s; and 2) to examine SNH affiliation with health networks and systems to see whether these patterns differ from those of non-SNHs. We distinguish SNHs and non-SNHs because of issues raised in a recent Institute of Medicine (2000) report about the vulnerability of the U.S. health safety net nationwide. Our conceptual framework and empirical modeling draw extensively on the original research of Alexander and Morrisey (1988) , who examined patterns of hospital entry into multihospital systems during the 1980s. Thus, our analysis allows comparisons of patterns of system affiliation during the 1990s and this earlier period. Given the substantial changes that occurred in health markets between the 1980s and 1990s-namely the growth in managed care, the shift towards payer-driven rather than patient-driven competition, and provider efforts to develop integrated health organizations-an update of Alexander and Morrisey's original research is worthwhile.
The next section of the paper discusses the benefits of hospital involvement in health networks and systems. Then, we present a conceptual framework based on the work of Alexander and Morrisey. An empirical specification of the model and key variables are discussed along with analytical procedures. Finally, we present our empirical results, along with policy implications and suggestions for future research.
Benefits of Health Network and System Involvement
During the 1990s, hospitals and other health providers consolidated horizontally and vertically to develop what Shortell and others have called ''organized delivery systems'' (Devers et al. 1994; Shortell, Gillies, and Anderson 1994) . Some have viewed these arrangements as approaches to rearrange local health service delivery to improve the competitive positions of involved health providers. Hospital decisions to form or participate in these arrangements were based on the benefits hospitals could derive relative to what they would achieve through independent action. Health networks and systems also had to perceive benefits from adding new hospitals to their arrangements if they were to extend an offer of affiliation to these hospitals. This section describes the potential benefits that arise for hospitals and for health networks/systems, and thus sets the stage for our conceptual model. Also, we discuss the roles that SNHs can play in networks and systems and how this might affect their participation.
Generally, health networks and systems hold potential for increasing a hospital's revenues or reducing its expenditures, and thus improving its overall financial performance. While the vast majority of U.S. hospitals are organized as nonprofit institutions, maintaining good financial condition is important to ensure the institution's continuing ability to offer services and support mission-driven activities. Thus, health network and system participation can help a nonprofit institution remain vital and viable within its community.
Revenue enhancements that can arise through health network and system participation may result from implementing new, or expanding existing, profitable service lines in response to market opportunities. Unaffiliated hospitals may not have sufficient resources or scale to undertake these revenue-enhancing initiatives, but health networks and systems-with their multiple affiliates and ability to centralize services-might. In addition, health networks and systems may be in a better position to obtain managed care contracts. For example, through single signature contracting for a group of providers, health networks and systems could reduce contract administration costs for managed care organizations. Networks and systems also can bring greater uniformity in processes among their affiliates, which could lower contract monitoring costs for managed care organizations. On the other hand, health networks and systems may exert greater clout as a bargaining agent for a block of providers when negotiating with private payers (Bazzoli, Dynan, and Burns 1999/2000; Lesser and Brewster 2001) .
Health networks and systems also may implement strategies that reduce organizational expenses. This can occur in a variety of ways. First, health networks and systems may consolidate administrative functions and thereby lower unit costs for this form of overhead. Second, by pooling organizational needs, health networks and systems may be able to negotiate better terms from vendors. Third, as noted by Bazzoli et al. (1999) and Shortell et al. (2000) , some health networks and systems have rearranged services across affiliates by centralizing some services in one or a few affiliates rather than having these services diffused across the network/system. Bazzoli et al. (2000) found that these actions were associated with lower hospital costs and better overall financial performance based on the degree of centralization achieved. Fourth, by pooling risks across organizational affiliates, health networks and systems may lower capital acquisition costs. Finally, health networks and systems may facilitate the sharing of management expertise and viewpoints among affiliates, either through voluntary exchange or more formalized organization-wide action.
Thus far, we have focused on the similarities in the benefits hospitals may derive from health networks and systems. However, these two organizational forms are distinct, and their differences likely affect hospital affiliation decisions. Health systems have unified ownership and control over their facilities, although health networks do not. Thus, hospitals that are performing well financially or that place a high value on their autonomy may see more value in a health network affiliation where they retain their profits and independence. Health systems, on the other hand, are more likely to create greater uniformity across their affiliated hospitals through centralized decision-making control. If consumers value hospital ''branding,'' as suggested by Dranove and Shanley (1995) , greater uniformity can lead to higher hospital revenues and better financial perfor-mance among system affiliates. Hospitals that are small with limited market share may be particularly advantaged by this kind of marketing benefit. Further, health systems absorb the financial assets and liabilities of hospitals they acquire, and may infuse needed financial capital to keep affiliates competitive. Networks do not provide this sort of capital infusion because hospitals retain their ownership and must meet their own financial obligations. Thus, network affiliation may afford a hospital greater control, freeing it to focus on its mission and objectives, but this comes at the cost of a financial commitment that could be obtained through a system.
Likewise, a health network or system must assess the value it derives from adding a hospital to its existing complement. A new hospital could bring a unique set of health services not offered by others or increased capacity to provide certain profitable services. Alternatively, a new hospital could provide marketing benefits due to its reputation or could be located in a key area of a market that improves the network/system's overall bargaining position with health plans. Health systems additionally must consider the financial risks they take on when they acquire a particular hospital: Is the hospital performing well enough to justify its acquisition costs or can it be readily improved? Health networks have less concern in this regard because they do not take on the financial obligations of their affiliates.
Of course, financial concerns are not the sole factor for health networks and systems as they seek to add affiliates, especially those that have strong commitments to nonprofit objectives. Health networks and systems may add hospital affiliates to improve their overall community service or to aid hospitals that are struggling financially. From this perspective, SNHs present special opportunities and challenges for health networks and systems. Lipson (1997) noted that multiprovider arrangements with SNHs may be better able to attract Medicaid managed care contracts given SNHs' existing experience in dealing with Medicaid and poor patients. Also, health networks or systems that have a predominant nonprofit mission may benefit from SNH affiliation if the SNH satisfies community expectations about the network/system's local community benefit activities (Lee, Alexander, and Bazzoli 2003) . A key challenge to a network or system is how a SNH's commitment to indigent care Inquiry/Volume 40, Spring 2003 may affect the network or system. For instance, will the SNH's participation attract more indigent care demand throughout the network/system because of the SNH's highly recognized role in this regard? Particularly for health systems, will the SNH's indigent commitment place too much demand on the system's financial resources? These considerations affect the network/system's decision to extend an offer of affiliation to a SNH.
In addition, SNHs face tough choices in deciding whether to accept an offer of affiliation with a network or system. While a health network or system may provide improvements in private payer contracting and the potential to implement cost-saving efficiencies, affiliation may affect public revenues, disproportionate share payments, or tax support that the SNH has received. This may be especially true for system affiliation because a SNH's ownership status might change or because the system's parent organization might decide to reduce the scope or scale of the charitable activities of the newly acquired SNH. Given this, a SNH must weigh the benefits it could receive through health network or system affiliation against what it could lose through participation in a particular multihospital arrangement. Table 1 reports data on the health network and system affiliation status of urban SNHs and non-SNHs. 2 We identified SNHs for this table using approaches developed by Zuckerman et al. (2001) that will be discussed later. In 1993, 5.7% of urban non-SNHs were affiliated with a health network and 45.1% were affiliated with a system. Relatively more SNHs were in health networks and fewer were in health systems in that year. These 1993 distributions for SNH and non-SNHs were significantly different (at p .05). Among unaffiliated hospitals in 1993, SNHs were less likely to remain unaffiliated by 1998 and more likely to join a health network when compared to non-SNHs. These latter distributions were also significantly different (at p .05).
Conceptual Framework
The previous discussion suggests that a hospital's inclusion in a health network or system is a strategic decision for which both the hospital and the health network/system derive value. Alexander and Morrisey (1988) provided a theoretical framework for modeling this strategic decision, focusing on hospital acquisition by a multihospital system. We begin with their framework and expand it to examine affiliation with a health network.
Affiliation with a Health System
The basic argument behind the Alexander and Morrisey model is that certain independent hospitals in a market may not be living up to their potential in generating net revenue. Systems acquiring these hospitals may be able to implement actions that improve the hospitals' financial performance. As a result, the systems receive a positive financial return to their investment in these initially under-performing hospitals. Because the hospital industry has both for-profit and nonprofit organizations, this motivation for system acquisition requires further elaboration. For for-profit hospitals, owners or stockholders may view the hospital as taking insufficient action to maximize profits or organizational net worth. Nonprofit hospitals typically have more complex objectives. In particular, Newhouse (1970) characterized these institutions as seeking to maximize the utility of hospital decision makers (such as governing boards or community stakeholders generally) through the expansion of the quantity and quality of services offered. However, quality and quantity expansions are only possible if a hospital carefully manages its resources and generates internal surpluses in patient revenue streams. Thus, a nonprofit hospital that is inefficient in managing its resources or generating revenues will not be maximizing the utility of its governing board or community stakeholders.
A health system may be better positioned to implement management and operational changes that improve the net revenues of for-profit or nonprofit hospitals. The prior section provided some idea how these improvements could result. Regardless of the sources of improvement, if a health system has potential to improve the net present value of a hospital's future net revenue stream beyond what the hospital could generate on its own, the stage is set for the hospital and system to negotiate a sales price for the acquisition of the hospital. At the very minimum, the hospital would accept a sales price that equaled the net present value of its future net revenues from its continued independent operation (we call this, the hospital's ''reservation sales price''). On the other hand, the system would be willing to pay at most the net present value of future net revenues that the system could generate if it acquired the hospital (we call this the system's ''reservation purchase price''). The probability of system acquisition increases as the gap between the hospital's reservation sales price and the system's reservation purchase price increases.
Alexander and Morrisey discussed three general types of factors that could expand this gap and thus the probability of system acquisition. First, they noted that a health system might be more capable of exploiting favorable market conditions than would independent hospitals. This is consistent with our earlier arguments about systems being able to improve a hospital's private payer revenue streams by expanding certain services to a scale where they are highly profitable or by increased leverage in health plan contract-ing. Like Alexander and Morrisey, we define market factors as being beyond the control of hospitals, including such things as community socioeconomic characteristics, physician market characteristics, and regulatory factors. In addition, we look at an important market factor not studied by Alexander and Morrisey, namely managed care market share. Managed care was not a major force for their 1980-83 study, but it certainly was important in the 1990s. Although higher managed care market share would signify an ''unfavorable'' market for most hospitals, it could encourage (rather than discourage) system acquisition so providers could gain market power in negotiations with managed care organizations. 3 The second factor noted by Alexander and Morrisey was the presence of poor management within unaffiliated hospitals. Holding constant market conditions, poor management will drive down a hospital's expected net present value of future net revenues. A system may be able to inject new and more highly skilled managers to improve the hospital's future financial performance. This argument is consistent with our discussion of potential cost-reducing actions that systems might take. Like Alexander and Morrisey, we define management factors to include those elements of operation that a hospital board and its administrative management can affect, such as hospital staffing and use of other inputs to production.
The third factor noted by Alexander and Morrisey was hospital mission. Hospitals with a substantial commitment to community service and teaching may have a higher reservation sales price than otherwise comparable hospitals because of concerns about how their assets will be deployed after the acquisition. A SNH must consider how the acquisition would affect the hospital's payer and patient mix, Medicare and Medicaid disproportionate share hospital payments, or tax appropriations, all of which involve a SNH's mission-related objectives. These could be affected by ownership or operational changes implemented by the system. If SNH board members and administrators believe that the hospital, once acquired, will be less able to support community service needs, they may be less willing to sell the institution. Conversely, a SNH may view a particular system as an effective agent for advancing its mission-driven activities, and this may lower the hospital's reservation sales price. This would occur if the hospital could identify systems that shared its mission and values. Generally, this discussion suggests that hospital ownership, service mix, commitment to indigent care, and teaching status-as well as the distribution of for-profit and nonprofit systems in a market-affect the likelihood of a hospital's acquisition.
As suggested previously, SNH status is one of several potential mission-related characteristics that may have a direct effect on hospital system affiliation decisions. The effect of SNH status may be more complex. In addition to having a direct effect, SNH status may interact with hospital and market conditions to influence a system's valuation of the benefits derived from hospital acquisition. Higher levels of local indigent care demand may detract from a health system's valuation of the hospital, especially when the system has a weak commitment to community service. As managed care organizations become more dominant, the value of a SNH may decline because the system must place more emphasis on achieving efficiencies and likely has fewer resources to finance charitable activities (Davidoff et al. 2000; Thorpe, Seiber, and Florence 2001) .
Affiliation with a Health Network
Thus far, we have focused strictly on health systems and not on health networks. We can extend the Alexander and Morrisey (1988) framework to include health networks. To do so, it is necessary to recall that a hospital retains its ownership when it affiliates with a network. Thus, the value of network affiliation is the improvement in financial performance that a hospital realizes and retains through membership in the network. For a health network to extend an offer to a new affiliate, however, hospitals that already are members of the network must realize some benefit from the new affiliate. One such benefit could be greater ability of already affiliated hospitals to centralize certain health services and save costs. Alternatively, hospitals already in the network might experience increases in revenues through positive revenue externalities given the reputation of the new affiliate (i.e., a halo effect). Finally, hospitals already in the network might benefit through increased stakeholder utility or local legitimacy given the charitable programs of the newly affiliated hospital.
We posit that health networks, like health systems, are better able to take advantage of favorable market demand conditions. Networks may be better able than independent hospitals to expand certain services to a more profitable scale and to negotiate better terms with vendors and health plans. Holding market conditions constant, we further expect that stronger (rather than weaker) hospital management will increase the likelihood of a hospital affiliating with a health network. Hospitals that already are performing well financially are less inclined to sell their institutions to health systems due to their high reservation sales price. However, they may see value in joining a health network because it may provide possibilities for financial improvement that the hospital cannot implement on its own. In addition, we posit that mission-driven hospitals may be more attracted to networks than to systems, given the hospitals' ability to retain control and pursue mission activities. SNHs retain their ownership and operational control if they affiliate with a network, and thus their special sources of support for charitable activities are not threatened. Further, existing network affiliates may be more willing to allow an SNH with a substantial indigent commitment to participate in their network because it may not adversely affect their existing indigent burdens and financial resources.
For health systems, we suggested that market and management factors might interact with SNH status and affect the participation of SNHs in these arrangements. It is not clear whether similar types of interactions operate for network affiliations, but we include the same set of interactions for networks and systems in our analysis.
Data and Empirical Model
Data for our analysis came from a variety of sources, including multiple years of the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey, hospital Medicare Cost Reports, the Area Resource File, InterStudy data on health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and data on Medicaid managed care compiled by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Like Alexander and Morrisey (1988) , we examined hospitals that initially were unaffiliated in a base year (for us 1993) and assessed their affiliation status through an ending year (for us 1998). We studied urban hospitals and assessed whether they remained unaffiliated, joined a network, or joined a system by 1998. 4 The discussion that follows provides detail on our hospital sample, empirical models and measures, analytical strategy, and specification tests.
Study Sample
In total, our sample consisted of 1,242 urban short-term, general acute care hospitals that were unaffiliated with a health network or system in 1993 and were operational throughout the 1993-98 period. After limiting our sample to those with complete data, the final sample consisted of 1,020 hospitals. We compared the ownership status, teaching status, bed size, and numbers of high-tech and high-touch services provided by hospitals included in the analysis with the characteristics of those hospitals excluded due to missing data. The only statistically significant difference ( p .10) related to ownership status. Relatively more excluded hospitals were for-profit as compared to included hospitals. This is common for hospital research, especially studies that include measures of hospital financial status or management characteristics. It is unclear how under-representation of for-profit hospitals affects our study findings other than the likely bias of the for-profit indicator included in our multivariate models.
An important element of our analysis was identifying hospital SNH status. Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted definition of SNHs. Many researchers have used simple organizational descriptors, such as public ownership or urban academic medical center, to define SNHs (Baxter and Mechanic 1997; Fishman and Bentley 1997; Gray 1998; Reuter and Gaskin 1998) . This is problematic in that not all identified hospitals will provide substantial amounts of uncompensated care. 5 In markets with numerous public hospitals, a prosperous local economy, broad eligibility for Medicaid, or high rates of employer-sponsored insurance, individual public hospitals or academic medical centers may have very little uncompensated care burden. Given this, we identify SNH status based on the actual amount of uncompensated care the hospital provided. The AHA Annual Survey was the primary source of our uncompensated care data. 6 We used SNH identification procedures developed by Zuckerman et al. (2001) , who implemented a definition of the safety net developed by the Institute of Medicine (2000) . The Institute of Medicine defined safety net institutions as those that demonstrated commitment to the delivery of significant levels of health care to the uninsured and other vulnerable patients. Zuckerman and his colleagues implemented ''significant'' in two ways: 1) from the hospital's perspective, in that a high proportion of the hospital's expenses were uncompensated; and 2) from a community's perspective, in that the hospital provided a large market share of uncompensated care in its community. 7 Zuckerman and his colleagues used thresholds for the percentage of hospital expenses that were uncompensated and for the hospital's adjusted market share of uncompensated care based on the work of Fishman (1997) , and their own examination of the distributions of these variables. 8 An advantage of the threshold-based approach of Zuckerman et al. (2001) is that it identifies a distinct group of hospitals deemed ''SNHs'' that can be contrasted with ''non-SNHs.'' The use of thresholds to create sharp distinctions is problematic though, because these are hard and fast boundaries that may not reflect diversity across markets and over time. Given this, we decided to estimate two sets of models: one using the threshold-based SNH indicators; and a second using continuous measures of the percentage of hospital expenses that were uncompensated, the hospital-adjusted market share of uncompensated care, and the squares of these variables. 9
Empirical Model
Our conceptual framework suggests the following empirical specification:
with AFFIL i ¼ become affiliated with a system, become affiliated with a network, or remain unaffiliated. Further, our discussion of potential SNH interaction effects suggests a second model:
where the last term, SNH*(Market, Management), denotes selected SNH interactions. An important empirical issue is the construction of the market, management, and mission measures in equations 1 and 2. Alexander and Morrisey (1988) noted that their conceptual model was based on unobservable future expectations and identified two perspectives for measuring these expectations. The first presumed that health markets were in long-term equilibrium and that organizational decision makers based their affiliation decisions on expected future changes in the environment. Alexander and Morrisey assumed that expectations of future changes were based on past trends in the explanatory variables they studied. The second perspective presumed that health markets were in disequilibrium and that affiliation decisions related to differences in the values of hospital and market characteristics at a point in time. The primary difference between these two perspectives is that the former suggests measuring explanatory variables as changes over time and the second suggests measuring variables as levels at a point in time. From our view, a disequilibrium perspective seemed more relevant for depicting hospital markets in the late 1990s, given the growth in health network and system affiliations noted earlier and the general turbulence in health markets noted by others (cf., Lesser and Ginsburg 2000) . Thus, our explanatory variables were measured as point-intime values, using the base year of 1993 to avoid potential endogeneity of the explanatory factors and network/system affiliation. 10 Our empirical definitions for market, management, and mission variables and descriptive statistics for these measures are reported in Table  2 . As noted in the table, several variable definitions were taken directly from Alexander and Morrisey, which allows us to directly compare our findings with theirs. Some market variables are modifications of theirs. Although Alexander and Morrisey included a variable for the number of for-profit hospitals in a market, we used the percentage of hospitals that were for-profit. Also, they used hospital revenues from Medicare, Medicaid, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield to compute market payer mix variables, but we used aggregated hospital data on inpatient days because the latter had higher item response rates than did AHA revenue questions. 11 All these market measures were obtained either from the Area Resource File or were calculated by aggregating AHA hospital data to the market level. 12 We also included a number of market variables not in the original Alexander and Morrisey study: HMO market share; Medicaid managed care market share; and measures of nonprofit and for-profit hospital involvement in health networks and systems. HMO data came from InterStudy, and market share measures were calculated using methods of Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson (1995) to allocate enrollment to service areas. Medicaid enrollment data came from the CMS and were allocated to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) using methods similar to those developed by Wholey and colleagues. 13 Alexander and Morrisey included a dummy variable indicating the presence of a for-profit system in a hospital's market in their analysis. Given that hospital affiliations with multihospital arrangements grew to approximately 50% by 1993, we felt that a dummy variable collapsed important variation in the prevalence of these arrangements across markets. In addition, Alexander and Morrisey did not include a measure of nonprofit multihospital arrangements in a market. To capture the presence and prevalence of for-profit and nonprofit arrangements, we created four measures and used them in place of the dummy variable of Alexander and Morrisey. These were: 1) the percentage of hospitals in the market that were for-profit system hospitals; 2) the percentage of hospitals in the market that were nonprofit system hospitals; 3) the percentage of hospitals in the market that were for-profit network hospitals; and 4) the percentage of hospitals in the market that were nonprofit network hospitals. 14 For hospital management, we replicated the three measures examined by Alexander and Morrisey: total margin; the ratio of payroll expenses to total hospital expenses; and hospital occupancy rates. As these authors noted, the measures are not only a function of underlying management capabilities but also of market factors. Thus, their direct inclusion in our multivariate analysis of equations 1 and 2 confounds management skill effects with market factor effects. To isolate management effects, we followed Alexander and Morrisey's strategy of estimating subsidiary regressions for each management measure. 15 Residuals from the subsidiary regressions then were calculated and used in our multivariate analysis of network and system affiliation.
Finally, the hospital mission variables replicate many of the measures used by Alexander and Morrisey. We replaced their count measure of all inpatient services and facilities offered by the hospital with two service mix measures developed by Dranove and Shanley (1995) : 1) the count of five high-technology services offered by a hospital (MRI, neonatal intensive care, open heart surgery, cardiac catheterization, therapeutic radiology); and 2) the count of four high-touch services offered by the hospital (obstetrics care, pediatrics care, substance abuse care, and home care). Our SNH variables are also measures of hospital mission. As noted earlier, we examine in our multivariate analysis both continuous measures of SNH involvement (i.e., the percentage of hospital expenses that were uncompensated and adjusted uncompensated care market share) as well as threshold indicators for high uncompensated care expense and high market share of uncompensated care.
Analytic Strategy
We examined whether unaffiliated hospitals in 1993 remained unaffiliated, joined a network, or joined a system by 1998. There are three analytical approaches one can use to analyze this multichotomous choice problem: a multinomial logit model; a multinomial probit model; and a nested logit. Multinomial logit is by far the least computationally difficult to estimate and provides readily interpretable parameter estimates. It also has the restrictive assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, which requires that a hospital's choice between any two options (e.g., affiliating with a network and remaining unaffiliated) is unaffected by the presence of other options (e.g., affiliating with a system). Although we have argued that health networks and systems have fundamental differences, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption was violated. On the face of it, this would make multinomial probit or nested logit more appealing, but both have insurmountable problems given their complexity and our available data. 16 Thus, we looked more closely to assess whether the independence of irrelevant alternatives was substantially violated in multinomial logit analysis. We conducted Hausman and McFadden (1984) specification tests that allowed us to examine whether systematic difference in multinomial logit coefficients existed when one restricted choice to a limited set of options rather than the full set. 17 Seven of eight Hausman-McFadden specification tests that we conducted were insignificant, and we concluded that independence of irrelevant alternatives must not be substantially violated in our analysis. We thus proceeded with multinomial logit for model estimation.
Study Results
We begin by examining results of the estimation of equation 1, focusing specifically on the model with the continuous measures of the percentage of hospital expenses uncompensated and hospital adjusted market share of uncompensated care. These results are reported in Table 3 and the system affiliation results are comparable to Alexander and Morrisey's analysis. We then look at alternative specifications of SNH involvement, contrasting the model with the continuous uncompensated care measures with the model that has the SNH threshold variables and the model with the SNH interactions. Rather than report multinomial logit coefficients, which relate to the relative odds of affiliating with a network or a system versus remaining unaffiliated, we report the estimated effects of each variable on the probability of network or system affiliation.
Market, Management, and Mission Effects on Network/System Affiliation
As Table 3 shows, few market variables had a significant effect on system affiliation. The only significant market variables for system affiliation were HMO market share and the percentage of inpatient days in the hospital's market covered by Medicare, both of which increased the likelihood of hospital system affiliation. The story is different with respect to network affiliation, where more market variables were significant. Hospitals were more likely to affiliate with a health network in markets with: 1) a lower percentage of inpatient days covered by Medicare; 2) lower unemployment; or 3) lower HMO market share. Generally, low values on these variables were associated with more favorable market conditions during our study period. Low Medicare inpatient share in a market was likely viewed favorably by the hospital industry because Medicare payments generally did not cover the costs of treating these patients in the early 1990s (MedPAC 2002) . Low HMO market share implies that there was less payer-driven competition directed at cutting hospital utilization and expenditures. Finally, low unemployment rates most likely indicate a more munificent environment, and possibly could imply more access to employment-based insurance coverage. 18 These latter findings are consistent with our conceptual model, which suggested that health networks might be better able than independent hospitals to exploit favorable market conditions by expanding certain services or negotiating better terms with vendors and payers. Three additional market variables (percentage of hospitals that were nonprofit system hospitals, percentage of hospitals that were nonprofit network hospitals, and percentage of hospitals that were for-profit network hospitals) also had strong effects on the probability of network affiliation. Together, these variables suggest that a hospital was more likely to join a network if relatively more hospitals in its market-whether for-profit or nonprofit-were affiliated with health networks. Health networks were simply more prevalent in these communities, and thus there may have been more affiliation options available. Conversely, the more local nonprofit hospitals affiliated with systems, the less likely a hospital would affiliate with a network. Interestingly, system affiliation was unaffected by these measures. These latter findings may reflect the relative saturation of health systems in markets by 1993, with subsequent acquisitions occurring in 1994 through 1998 as a move to respond to high base-year presence of HMOs or high Medicare inpatient share in the market.
For the management measures, the ratio of hospital payroll expenses to total expenses was negatively associated with the likelihood of system affiliation and positively associated with network affiliation. The two other management measures were significantly related to system affiliation. Hospitals with lower total margins and those with higher occupancy rates were more likely to affiliate with systems. Hospital margins and occupancy rates did not have a significant impact on network affiliation.
Several mission variables were important to health network/system affiliation. For health net- works, the probability of affiliation was lower for for-profit hospitals and higher for public hospitals relative to voluntary nonprofits. System affiliation was more likely among larger hospitals (measured by bed size) and less likely among public hospitals. Also, hospitals with more hightech services and fewer high-touch services were more likely to affiliate with a system. Finally, the model contains our continuous uncompensated care measures related to SNH commitment. We defer discussion of these variables to the next section.
Our results share several similarities and differences with the system affiliation findings of Alexander and Morrisey (1988: Table 4 ). We found that few market variables influenced system affiliation, which is consistent with Alexander and Morrisey's results. 19 Alexander and Morrisey also found a negative effect for payroll as a percentage of total expenses on system affiliation, and concluded that high values of this variable suggested labor/management problems that were difficult to resolve. They further found that hospitals with lower total margins and lower occupancy rates were more likely to affiliate with systems. Our findings concurred in relation to the effects of total margin, but differed in relation to occupancy rate. In relation to mission variables, we found identical results in relation to ownership status. In contrast, we found that larger, more technically complex hospitals were more likely to affiliate, whereas they found that smaller hospitals with fewer services affiliated. Overall, a comparison of their findings and ours suggest that system acquisition strategies have changed in the 1990s vis-à-vis the 1980s, especially in relation to some key management and mission factors.
Safety Net Hospital Status: Overall and Interactive Effects
To address our second research question, we examined both the overall effects of SNH status on network and system affiliation as well as more finely grained effects resulting from interaction of SNH status with management and market conditions. Table 4 summarizes the SNH results for three models: Model 1, which contained the continuous uncompensated care measures; Model 2, which replaced the continuous uncompensated care measures with the two SNH threshold indicators; and Model 3, which contained the thresh-old indicators and their interactions with various variables. For Model 3, we selected interactions with SNH status because they reflected: 1) the extent of indigent care need or supply (i.e., unemployment rate, SNH hospital occupancy rate); 2) the extent of payer pressure in the market (i.e., HMO market share, Medicaid managed care market share); or 3) the prevalence of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals affiliated with health networks and systems, which might influence the ability of a SNH to find a compatible network/ system. All three versions of the model included the full range of non-SNH variables in Table 3 . For ease of presenting study findings, we only report the SNH variables and their interactions. 20 The results for Models 1 and 2 are similar in what they suggest about SNH involvement in health networks and systems. In Model 1, the probability of affiliation with either a health network or health system increased with base-year percentage of hospital expenses that were uncompensated but at a diminishing rate. For health networks, the positive effect of percentage of hospital expenses that were uncompensated on affiliation ended at about 14% of hospital expenses, which is about the 97 th percentile of the observed values of this variable for our study hospitals. The positive effect for health system acquisition ended at about 38%, which is the 99 th percentile for study hospitals. The adjusted uncompensated care market share measures were not significantly associated with network or system affiliation. In Model 2, the effect of a hospital having a high percentage of expenses that were uncompensated was insignificant for both network and system affiliation. This makes sense given the results for the uncompensated care variables in Model 1 and our use of the 90 th percentile of the percentage of hospital uncompensated expenses as the threshold for our high uncompensated care variable. The high uncompensated care adjusted market share indicator did not have a significant effect on network affiliation but had a marginally significant, negative effect on system affiliation.
The results of Model 3 suggest that the simple direct effects of the SNH measures in Models 1 and 2 may mask important SNH interactive effects. Interpretation of these interactive effects requires special care because one must account for both the direct and interactive effects of each variable to understand its influence. This is impor-tant because a positive and significant interaction (for example) may simply offset a negative and significant direct effect. We constructed total effects for each of the interacted variables-namely the sum of the direct and interacted effect-and reported these in Table 4 . These total effects not only allow us to assess how the variables affected SNH affiliations with networks and systems but also allow us to directly compare estimated effects in Table 3 (for all hospitals) with those in Table 4 (for specific types of SNHs). We computed standard errors for the total effects using the variances and covariances of parameter estimates derived from the multinomial logit analysis.
Model 3 results suggest that safety net hospitals with a high percentage of expenses that were uncompensated were significantly less likely to affiliate with health networks when all the variables included in the interactions were near zero in value. As the percentage of nonprofit hospitals that were in health networks increased, this negative effect was offset. Thus, in markets where nonprofit hospitals already have lined up largely in different networks, hospitals with a high percentage of uncompensated expenses are more likely to become network affiliated. This suggests that these SNHs may be late or last candidates for consideration in networks as they develop. In terms of system affiliation, we found a large positive effect of the high percentage of uncompensated expenses on the probability of system affiliation in Model 3. These hospitals are more likely to join systems when all of the variables included as interactions are near zero in value. However, while we found that high base year HMO market share was negatively associated with network affiliation for hospitals with a high percentage of uncompensated expenses, we did not see an offsetting positive effect on their affiliation with health systems. This latter pattern of findings was apparent in Table 3 , with the HMO market share variable having the opposite and nearly same magnitude effect (in absolute value terms) on health network versus health system affiliation. This suggests that market conditions are important when considering network/system affiliation for a hospital with a high percentage of uncompensated expenses. The findings for hospitals with high adjusted uncompensated care market share differ from those for hospitals with a high percentage of expenses that are uncompensated. Looking at the high adjusted uncompensated care market share indicator in Model 3, it is significant in both the network and system affiliation models. High uncompensated care market share hospitals were more likely to be affiliated with a health network and less likely to be affiliated with a system relative to hospitals generally when all the variables included in interactions were near zero in value. Further, the effects of the significant interactive terms in the network affiliation model (percentage of hospitals that are nonprofit system affiliated, percentage of hospitals that are for-profit system affiliated, percentage of hospitals that are nonprofit network affiliated, HMO market share, and unemployment rate) are identical in sign and similar in magnitude to the patterns for these variables in the network affiliation model of Table 3 . This suggests that SNHs with high uncompensated care market share do not differ markedly from hospitals generally in the ways these variables affect their network affiliation status.
In relation to system affiliation, we note that the likelihood that a hospital with high adjusted uncompensated care market share would be acquired by a system between 1994 and 1998 increased as the percentage of hospitals in nonprofit health networks for the base year increased. These SNHs might have been seeking out system affiliations as the market was increasingly penetrated by multihospital arrangements.
The results suggest that high adjusted uncompensated care market share hospitals did not have increased probability of system affiliation when base year HMO market share increased. Thus, it does not appear that these latter safety net hospitals are sought out as system affiliates in markets with high HMO penetration.
Discussion and Study Implications
The hospital industry was buffeted by a variety of pressures in the 1990s, creating a rethinking of patterns of operation and organizational relationships. While multihospital systems have existed for many years, a large share of hospitals operated independently through the 1980s. During the 1990s, hospitals and other health providers developed new models of operation to improve their competitive position and chances for survival. These substantive changes in market pressures and hospital objectives provide good reasons to update the analysis of Alexander and Morrisey (1988) . Our paper seeks to understand how hospitals generally, and safety net hospitals specifically, responded to hospital and market pressures of the 1990s in their participation in health networks and systems.
We found that patterns of hospital affiliation with systems in the 1990s were different than those in the 1980s. In this earlier period, Alexander and Morrisey found that small hospitals with limited services and low occupancy were more likely system acquisition targets. In the 1990s, we found that larger hospitals with more hightech services and higher occupancy rates were more common system targets. While acquired hospitals in both Alexander and Morrisey and our study periods tended to have lower profitability, and thus could benefit through improved management, there was a fundamental shift in the size and service structure of acquired hospitals across the study periods. Systems of the 1990s might have focused on larger market players that could add competitive advantage in local and regional systems of care delivery.
Several interesting findings resulted from our analysis of SNH involvement in health networks and systems. Our conceptual model suggested that SNHs generally would prefer health network affiliation to health system acquisition. Health network affiliations potentially provide SNHs greater ability to pursue mission-related activities and greater control over operational decisions that could affect indigent care support. Overall, our findings suggest that generalizations about SNH involvement in these arrangements mask important relationships that become apparent only when one examines interactions of market conditions and hospital SNH status. In markets where large shares of nonprofit hospitals already have affiliated with health networks, hospitals with a high percentage of uncompensated expenses were more likely to affiliate with a network. The driving forces behind affiliation of high adjusted uncompensated care market share hospitals with health networks were similar to those identified for hospitals generally. However, for hospitals with either a high percentage of uncompensated expenses or high adjusted uncompensated care market share, high base year HMO market share deterred subsequent health network affiliation but did not have an offsetting positive effect on health system participation, which was true for hospitals generally. Acquisition of these hospitals might have value for a system in terms of demonstrating a system's commitment to community benefit or facilitating price/quality discrimination, but safety net hospitals were not sought out for affiliation in markets with substantial payer pressure.
These results have important implications for the hospital industry and health policy. If multihospital arrangements help their affiliates in highly competitive markets, our findings suggest that system acquisition strategies of the 1990s might have left smaller, less technically advanced hospitals behind. Given the excess capacity of inpatient services that exists in some urban markets, this strategy may facilitate the exit of smaller, low-occupancy hospitals, which could improve overall efficiency within these markets. However, this leaves more concentrated markets where networks and systems are built around large hospital players that can exert substantial pressure in health plan negotiations. Also, our findings suggest that safety net hospital participation in health networks and systems may be limited to particular markets with little payer pressure and with well-established networks and systems with compatible nonprofit objectives.
There are several limitations to our analysis that provide many opportunities for future research. First, as noted earlier, we were stymied in our attempts to examine how the specific operational characteristics of health networks and systems affect hospital affiliation decisions. The future availability of data on operational dimensions of health networks and systems could provide a basis for extending our analysis. Such data likely would yield better understanding of patterns of hospital affiliation with different types of health networks and systems. Second, while existing research has examined the effects of health network and system affiliation on hospital financial performance, research needs to investigate what specific benefits safety net hospitals derive as they affiliate with systems and networks. Does their participation lead to improvements in SNH financial position? Does it improve their access to managed care contracts? This is especially important because SNHs must weigh the effects of potential private revenue enhancement against potential losses of public sources of support if their ownership status changes through system affiliation. Further, how does network/ system involvement affect the level of SNH commitment to safety net activities? This, too, is important for understanding how a SNH's funding streams might be affected by health network or system participation.
We view our research as providing a needed foundation for examining these types of questions. To study the effects of SNHs' participation in health networks and systems on the dimensions noted previously, one first must model factors affecting SNH participation in these arrangements so as to control for selection effects. As such, our conceptual model and empirical findings provide a beginning point to assess the extent to which SNH involvement in networks or systems affects hospital efficiency, revenue streams and payer mix, quality of patient care, continuing commitment to safety net care, and continued viability in today's marketplace. (2000); 1993 data are based on the authors' calculations of AHA Annual Survey data. 2 Our study focuses strictly on urban hospitals because health networks and systems have formed in these communities to achieve the kinds of benefits noted earlier. The objectives of rural networks and systems may be quite different with more focus on providing purchasing alliances (Chan, Feldman, and Manning 1999) . In addition, given the limited number of hospitals in rural communities, rural safety nets may center more on clinics and physicians than on hospitals. 3 For this to be true, the acquiring system must have an existing presence in the local market so that the system increases its market share and clout through the new acquisition. Given the growth in systems nationwide and their increased emphasis on local and regional development, this is likely to be the case in many markets during our study period. 4 A small minority of study hospitals had multiple transitions in, out, and between network and system categories during our study period. For our purposes, we retained hospitals that transitioned from unaffiliated status to a network and then to a system, deeming them ''system affiliated'' because this series of transitions suggests that network status might be a temporary step before formal system affiliation. Hospitals that made other sorts of multiple transitions between 1994 and 1998 were excluded because this complex behavior was beyond the scope of our study. In total, 6.5% of urban community hospitals were excluded because of this. Furthermore, a number of study hospitals had dual membership in health systems and networks. In these cases, we assigned membership to the system because systems, relative to networks, are more formalized and exercise more control over hospital operations and decision making. 5 Like many other researchers, we define uncompensated care to be the sum of charity care and bad debt expenses, both measured in terms of costs. Rundall, Sofaer, and Lambert (1988) noted that differences in the definitions and accounting practices for charity care and bad debt expenses across hospitals are substantial, and thus render the distinction between bad debts and charity care meaningless. 6 The AHA classifies Annual Survey data on charity care and bad debt expenses as confidential data elements, which are excluded from Annual Survey public use files. We obtained access to these items through a subcontract with the AHA's Health Research and Educational Trust, which is the AHA's research and educational affiliate. 7 Zuckerman et al. (2001) used an adjusted market share measure because market shares are highly dependent on the number of hospitals in a market. Namely, if there were four hospitals in a market and all had equal uncompensated care market share, each would provide 25% of uncompensated care; but if there were 10 hospitals in a market with equal uncompensated care market shares, each would have a 10% share. The adjustment used by Zuckerman and his colleagues was straightforward, namely multiplying each hospital's uncompensated care market share by the number of hospitals in its market, which eliminates the effect of varying numbers of hospitals per market. 8 Specifically, Zuckerman et al. (2001) followed Fishman and Bentley (1997) and used the top decile of the percentage of hospital expenses that were uncompensated in a given year as the threshold for high uncompensated care expense and used a value of 2 for adjusted market share as a threshold for high uncompensated care market share. See Zuckerman et al. (2001: 160-161) for more elaboration and justification of these specific thresholds. 9 Given that we study hospital behavior over time, one must consider how stable these SNH indicators are over an extended period. To assess this, we looked at three years before and three years after our base period of 1993. Overall, 70% of SNHs in 1993 were SNHs in 1990, and 70% of SNHs in 1993 were SNHs in 1996. In relation to the uncompensated care data, the correlation of the percentage of hospital expenses that were uncompensated was . 67 between 1990 and 1993, and .72 between 1993 and 1996 . The correlation of adjusted uncompensated care market share was . 92 between 1990 and 1993, and .96 between 1993 and 1996 . Generally, these data suggested a reasonable degree of stability in SNH indicators over time. 10 However, we did estimate versions of our models in which market and management variables were measured as changes over time, namely differences between 1993 and 1990 values. Generally, we found that these models yielded fewer significant findings, in part because some explanatory variables lacked much variation over time.
Notes
In some models, one or two market variables that were insignificant in the point-in-time model were significant in the change version of the model, and vice versa. These differences had little impact on our overall conclusions. Readers interested in the change models can receive relevant tables and specification tests from the lead author. 11 Also note that we could not construct a payer mix variable for Blue Cross/Blue Shield because these data were no longer collected by the AHA by 1993. 12 In our analysis, we defined markets as Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). There is, of course, no generally accepted definition of health markets. Increasingly, researchers are using geopolitical boundaries, either counties or MSAs, for markets given their convenience and the lack of national data from all payers to assess patient flows (Bernstein and Gauthier 1998 ). An additional advantage of using MSAs is that this market measure is consistent with the SNH identification approach developed by Zuckerman et al. (2001) . 13 More specifically, we used Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services data, compiled by the Institute for Health Services Research and Policy Studies of Northwestern University, that allocates annual Medicaid enrollment data to service areas for each health plan that has a Medicaid managed care full-service contract. The institute obtained service area data based on surveys of individual health plans and contacts with state Medicaid agencies. Using data on Medicaid enrollment for each state, they allocated managed care data for each plan to MSAs based on the distribution of the overall state population to different MSAs. They then summed allocated Medicaid managed care enrollment for all plans operating in an MSA and divided this by total Medicaid enrollment allocated to that MSA. Given the timing of the institute's efforts to develop these data, we do not have 1993 data but instead use 1994 data for our base measure. Those interested in learning more about this database should see Berry et al. (2000) . 14 For the nonprofit measures, we combined voluntary nonprofit and public hospitals. Conceptually, this made sense for consideration of SNH participation in systems and networks because both voluntary nonprofit and public hospitals have charitable objectives. We also did this for practical reasons because the percentage of public hospitals in systems was small and exhibited limited variation across markets. 15 Specifically, we estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for each of the three management variables, including all of the market factors listed in Table 2 as explanatory variables, namely: surgeons per 1,000 population; general practice/ family practice physicians per 1,000; proportion of MDs aged 45 to 54; hospital beds per 1,000; number of hospitals in the market; proportion of hospitals for-profit in the market; proportion of hospital inpatient days covered by Medicare; proportion of hospital days covered by Medicaid; unemployment rate; per capita income in $000s; proportion of HMO market share; proportion of hospitals that are nonprofit system hospitals; proportion of hospitals that are for-profit system hospitals; proportion of hospitals that are nonprofit network hospitals; and proportion of hospitals that are for-profit network hospitals. Using the estimated coefficients from the models, we predicted each hospital's total margin, occupancy rate, and payroll expenses as a percentage of total expenses given the values of the hospital's market measures on the items aforementioned. We then subtracted the hospital's predicted value from its actual value to obtain residuals for each of the three management measures. The advantage of using these residuals in the multivariate analysis is that the effects of market factors have been eliminated and thus can be interpreted more readily as hospital management effects. 16 The problem with multinomial probits is that they are notoriously difficult to estimate given their complex distributional assumptions. We attempted to estimate a version of multinomial probit on a small subset of variables in Table 2 but could not get these models to converge. In relation to nested logit, one could imagine a model in which a firststage choice involves a hospital deciding whether it should affiliate with some type of arrangement, and then a second-stage choice of a network or system for hospitals deciding to affiliate. While this is an interesting characterization, the challenge with nested logit is finding one set of variables to identify the first-stage choice model and a separate set of variables that identifies the second-stage model. The only distinguishing variable we had for the network/system choice was that the former involved diversified ownership and the latter involved centralized ownership. But this ownership variable exhibits no independent variation apart from the dependent variable, and thus cannot be used to identify the second-stage choice model. 17 We conducted four Hausman-McFadden specification tests for the restricted choice set of no affiliation/network affiliation and four tests for the restricted choice set of no affiliation/system affiliation. We first estimated the restricted models with the full set of variables found in Table 2 . Then we restricted the explanatory variables to those that were significant in an initial multinomial logit, setting these limits first at p .10 and then at p .05. Finally, we estimated a model that contained only the five most significant variables from the multinomial logit model based on p values. Examining different explanatory variable sets is important because Hausman-McFadden tests tend to not reject the null hypothesis of no systematic variation when several insignificant variables are present. 18 Certainly, unemployment rates are not a perfect measure for the extent of private insurance coverage, especially in the late 1990s, given the rising share of premiums borne by workers. A better and more direct measure would be the percentage of individuals aged 64 or younger in a market with private health insurance coverage. However, such data on rates of insurance coverage are available only at the state level, not the MSA level.
19 More specifically, they found that market factors mattered but largely when one examined for-profit system acquisition rather than system acquisition generally, which included both for-profit and nonprofit acquisitions.
20 The results of the non-SNH variables were highly consistent with those already reported in Table 3 . Readers interested in the full results for these models can obtain them from the lead author.
